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STATE OF UTAH, 
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-v-
ADOLPHO DIAZ MENDOZA and 
ALBERTO RUIZ MENDIETAf 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 20922 
STATEMENT QF ISSUES PRESENTED QN APPEAL 
The following issues are presented in this appeal: 
1. Did the trial court fail to follow the requirements 
of Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g) in granting defendants1 motions to 
suppress? 
2. Did the trial court apply an incorrect standard of 
law in determining that the stop of defendants1 vehicle was 
unlawful? 
3. Did the trial court incorrectly rule that 
defendants had standing to challenge the search of the vehicle 
they were driving? 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Defendants, Adolfo Diaz Mendoza and Alberto Ruiz 
Mendieta, were charged by information with possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute for value, a third 
degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1) (a)(ii) (Supp. 
1985) (RARM. 8; RADM. 9) .* After a preliminary hearing in the 
Ninth Circuit Courtf St. George Department, on April 1, 1985f 
both were bound over to stand trial in the Fifth District Court 
in Washington County (RARM. 3; RADM. 3). In district court, 
defendants filed separate motions to suppress evidence (namely a 
substantial amount of marijuana seized from the trunk of the car 
they were driving) on the ground that the evidence was seized in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution (RARM. 27-28; RADM. 14-15). After a hearing on July 
12, 1985, the district court granted defendants1 motions (RARM. 
89-90; RADM. 52-3; Appendix A). Because the State could not 
proceed without the suppressed evidence, it petitioned for and 
received an interlocutory appeal of the district court's order in 
this Court. After the district court set a trial date for 
defendants, this Court ordered the trial stayed until resolution 
of the State's interlocutory appeal. 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
At the hearing on defendants' motions to suppress in 
district court, the following evidence was presented. 
At approximately 4:45 a.m. on March 16, 1985, two U.S. 
Immigration Service border patrol officers were in a marked 
patrol vehicle parked in the median between the northbound and 
southbound lanes of 1-15 near St. George, Utah. They observed a 
black Ford Mustang automobile traveling north which bore 
California license plates and contained persons who appeared to 
1
 References to "RARM." are to the record in the Mendieta case; 
references to "RADM." are to the record in the Mendoza case. 
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be Mexican. The officers pulled onto the freeway behind the 
Mustang, accelerated to a high speed, and eventually caught up 
with the vehicle as it drove in the passing lane. They remained 
several feet behind the Mustang for a short time before it pulled 
over into the right-hand lane and decelerated rapidly (S.H. 49, 
52-4) .2 
The officers twice pulled alongside the Mustang to 
observe its occupants. The driver and the passenger, who like 
the driver looked Mexican, appeared to be extremely nervous. 
They studiously shunned eye contact with the officers and 
exhibited a rigid response to their presence which, according to 
one officer, was not "typical behavior11 (S.H. 57-60). The other 
officer testified that the driver had a "white-knuckle kind of 
look" which suggested that he was not at all relaxed (S.H. 116). 
After making these observations with the assistance of 
lights in a rest area, the officers turned on the red lights of 
their patrol car and stopped the Mustang to determine whether it 
contained illegal aliens. Short conversations with the driver 
and passenger, who were defendants, revealed that neither 
possessed any documents to show that he was legally in the United 
States. Defendant Mendoza, who wore a Mexican poncho, admitted 
that he was an illegal alien. The officers arrested both 
defendants and then opened the Mustang's trunk, which was large 
enough to hold a person, to ascertain whether it contained any 
illegal aliens. In the trunk the officers discovered numerous 
2 References to "S.H." are to the transcript of the suppression 
hearing. 
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plastic bags filled with marijuana (S.H. 58, 61-7, 119, 126A, 
129) . 
Both officers, who had eight and seven years of in-
field experience with the border patrol, testified that there 
were essentially seven factors upon which they relied in stopping 
defendants1 vehicle: (1) defendants1 Mexican physical features; 
(2) the route of travel (i.e., 1-15 is commonly used by illegal 
aliens from Mexico traveling north from the border between the 
United States and Mexico); (3) the time of day that defendants 
were traveling (i.e., early morning when it was still dark); (4) 
the time of year (the month of March is a peak period of illegal 
alien traffic from Mexico with the end of winter and the 
beginning of planting season); (5) the California plates on the 
vehicle (California being a state that shares a border with 
Mexico); (6) the erratic manner in which the car was driven; and 
(7) the extreme nervousness of defendants (S.H. 47, 51-60, 100, 
118). One officer further testified that with similar facts 
presented to him in previous situations, particularly the extreme 
nervousness of the vehicle's occupants, he had never stopped such 
a vehicle and had the occupants turn out to be anything but 
illegal aliens (S.H. 89). 
Defendant Mendoza testified to the following facts. 
The day before he was arrested near St. George, Mendoza borrowed 
a black Mustang from a friend in Los Angeles and drove to Las 
Vegas that evening to do some gambling. That same evening while 
still in Las Vegas, Mendoza attempted to call his friend in Los 
Angeles to ask for permission to drive defendant Mendieta, a 
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friend of Mendoza1s who was in Las Vegasf to Colorado. The 
purpose of the trip to Colorado/ according to Mendozaf was to 
pick up Mendieta's gravely ill mother and either bring her back 
to Las Vegas or leave her at Mendieta's sister's house* Mendieta 
had offered Mendoza $100 to pay for gas (S.H. 13-16). 
Mendoza reached the owner of the Mustang by telephone 
at Mendoza1s home in Los Angeles. Although Mendoza spoke with 
the ownerf the owner was drunk and could not be understood. 
However/ Mendoza spoke with his own brother who told him that the 
owner said it was all right to take the car to Colorado/ so long 
as Mendoza returned to Los Angeles two days later. Mendoza, who 
was driving at the time defendants were stopped/ admitted that 
neither he nor his passenger, Mendieta, owned the Mustang (S.H. 
18-30). 
After considering the evidence before it and the 
State's arguments concerning standing/ the district court granted 
defendants' motions to suppress/ ruling that both defendants had 
standing to challenge the stop of and subsequent search of the 
vehicle they were driving, that "there were no articulable facts 
as a basis or probable cause for [the] officers to make the 
initial stop of the [d]efendants[f] and that the stop was 
conducted in an unreasonable manner" (Transcript of Court's 
Ruling on Motion to Suppress at 3-5; RARM. 89-90; RADM. 52-3; 
Appendix A). The court denied the State's motion for 
reconsideration and clarification of the order granting the 
motions to suppress (Transcript of Court Proceedings on Sept. 18 , 
1985 at 3). The State appeals to this Court from the district 
court's suppression order. 
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SUMMARY OF ARCTIMENTS 
In granting defendants1 motions to suppress, the trial 
court failed to comply with the requirements of Utah R. Crim. P. 
12(g). Because that rule embodies a desirable and constitutional 
modification of the exclusionary rulef the court's failure to 
make the necessary findings under it before suppressing the 
challenged evidence should result in a reversal of its 
suppression order. 
The trial court applied an incorrect standard of law in 
ruling that the stop of defendants1 vehicle was unlawful. Under 
the applicable "reasonable suspicion" testf the stop was 
constitutional. Alternatively/ if the stop was not legal, 
evidence seized pursuant to it should not have been suppressed 
because the officers1 actions did not constitute a "substantial" 
violation of defendants1 constitutional rights; nor was the 
violation committed in bad faith. Under Rule 12(g), the evidence 
would therefore be admissible. 
Finallyf the trial courtfs ruling on standing is 
contrary to this Court's recent decision in State v. Valdez, 689 
P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984) . Because neither defendant owned the car 
they were driving or demonstrated a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in that car, they lack standing to challenge the search 
of the car. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS1 MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS, 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE THE FINDINGS 
REQUIRED UNDER UTAH R. CRIM. P. 12(g); 
THEREFORE, ITS ORDER SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g)(1) (UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-
12(g)(1)) provides: 
In any motion concerning the 
admissibility of evidence or the suppression 
of evidence pursuant to this section or at 
trial, upon grounds of unlawful search and 
seizure, the suppression of evidence shall 
not be granted unless the court finds the 
violation upon which it is based to be both a 
substantial violation and not committed in 
good faith. The court shall set forth its 
reasons for such finding. 
£££ AlStt UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-12 (1982) and UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 78-16-1 and -5 (Supp. 1985). In its order granting 
defendants1 motions to suppress (Appendix A) the trial court did 
not make the findings regarding "a substantial violation" and 
"good faith" that are required under Rule 12(g)(1). It ruled 
only "that there were no articulable facts as a basis or probable 
cause for [the] officers to make the initial stop of the 
[dlefendants and that the stop was conducted in an unreasonable 
manner." The court subsequently refused to modify that order 
even though the State asked it to make and set forth the reasons 
for the findings required under Rule 12(g) (1) . gee S t a t e ' s 
Motion For Reconsideration and Clarification (RARM. 65-8; RADM. 
44-7). 
There can be little dispute that the trial court 
effectively ignored the specific requirements of Rule 12(g)(1) 
when it suppressed the challenged evidence. The obvious purpose 
of that rule is to avoid the operation of the exclusionary rule 
where the unlawful search or seizure was neither substantial nor 
committed in bad faith. Therefore, a court must only suppress 
evidence in accordance with the policy expressly embodied in Rule 
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12(g). £££ alSLQ §§ 77-23-12, 78-16-1 and -5; Utah R. Evid. 402 
(Supp. 1985). Because the trial court here completely failed to 
do that, this Court should reverse its order granting defendants1 
suppression motions and enter the findings argued for by the 
State in Points II or III, iufxa. Although the discussion on 
this question could end here, the State, recognizing that this 
Court has never specifically ruled upon the constitutionality of 
Utahfs statutory "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, 
£&£ State Vt Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985), will 
address that issue below. 
A. The Federal Constitution 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Nearly identical language appears in article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. Recently, in United States v. Leon, U.S. 
, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984), the United States Supreme Court 
fashioned an objective good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule. Recognizing that the exclusionary rule "operates as 'a 
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
rights generally through its deterrent effect [on police 
misconduct], rather than a personal constitutional right of the 
person aggrieved,1" 104 S.Ct. at 3412, quoting United States V, 
Calandra. 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974), the Court held that the 
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prosecution may use in its case-in-chief evidence obtained by 
officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued 
by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be 
unsupported by probable cause. In so holding, the Court 
concluded that "the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by 
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance 
on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the 
substantial costs of exclusion." 104 S.Ct. at 3421. The Court 
cited with approval the following language from various cases: 
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary 
rule necessarily assumes that the police have 
engaged in willful, or at the very least 
negligent, conduct which has deprived the 
defendant of some right. By refusing to 
admit evidence gained as a result of such 
conduct, the courts hope to instill in those 
particular investigating officers, or in 
their future counterparts, a greater degree 
of care toward the rights of an accused. 
Where the official conduct was pursued in 
complete good faith, however, the deterrence 
rationale loses much of its force." 
104 S.Ct. at 3419, citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 
(1974); united States v. Peltier. 422 u.s. 531, 539 (1975). 
"If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is 
to deter unlawful police conduct, then 
evidence obtained from a search should be 
suppressed only if it can be said that the 
law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may 
properly be charged with knowledge, that the 
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment." 
104 S.Ct. at 3419-20, £itina Peltier, 422 U.S. at 542. 
In short, where the officer's conduct is 
objectively reasonable, 
"excluding the evidence will not further 
the ends of the exclusionary rule in any 
appreciable way; for it is painfully 
apparent that . . . the officer is 
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acting as a reasonable officer would and 
should act under the circumstances. 
Excluding the evidence can in no way 
affect his future conduct unless it is 
to make him less willing to do his 
duty." 
104 S.Ct. at 3420f siting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465f 539-40 
(1976) (White, J., dissenting). 
Although Lean, and its companion case, Massachusetts Y» 
Sheppardf U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 3424 (1984)f were decided in 
the context of reasonable reliance by police officers on a 
warrant approved by a magistrate, there is nothing in either of 
those decisions to indicate that the good faith exception could 
not also properly apply in warrantless situations. See I.N.S. v. 
Lopez-Mendoza, U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 3479f 3493 (1984) (White, 
J., dissenting). In fact, the Court's general discussion about 
the propriety of a good faith exception strongly suggests that 
such an extension of L^&n would be acceptable and desirable. For 
instance, in LJQQR the Court at one point states: 
[EJven assuming that the rule effectively 
deters some police misconduct and provides 
incentives for the law enforcement profession 
as a whole to conduct itself in accord with 
the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, 
and should not be applied, to deter 
objectively reasonable law enforcement 
activity. 
104 S.Ct. at 3419. 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , a number of c o u r t s have adopted a form 
of good f a i t h excep t ion to the exc lu s iona ry r u l e in a w a r r a n t l e s s 
search or s e i z u r e c o n t e x t . .£££, e t g . r United S t a t e s v , Owens, 
607 F. Supp. 140, 144-6 (D.C. Okla . 1983) ; United S t a t e s v . 
Wyler. 502 F.Supp. 969, 973-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) . The l e a d i n g case 
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appears to be United States v, Williamsr 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 
1980) (en banc) , cert, denied. 449 U.S. 1127 (1981) , where the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that evidence seized from the 
defendant incident to a warrantless arrest, which was ultimately 
determined to have been unlawful, should not be excluded because 
"evidence is not to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule 
where it is discovered by officers in the course of actions that 
are taken in good faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken, 
belief that they are authorized." 622 F.2d at 840. The court 
analyzed the appropriateness of a good faith exception in much 
the same way that the Supreme Court did in Leon, emphasizing that 
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is not furthered 
if the rule is applied to situations where police officers have 
acted in the good faith belief that their conduct is lawful. 622 
F.2d at 842. Numerous courts have cited Williams with approval. 
E.g. United States v. Cotton, 751 F.2d 1146 (loth cir. 1985); 
Donovan v, Federal Clearing Die Casting Co.f 695 F.2d 1020 (7th 
Cir. 1982); United States v, Nolan, 530 F.supp. 386 (W.D. pa. 
1981), afiid, 718 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1983); State v. Verkuylen, 
120 Wis.2d 59, 352 N.W.2d 668 (Wis. App. 1982); State v. Glass, 9 
Ohio Misc.2d 10, 458 N.E.2d 1302 (Ohio Com. PI. 1983). In short, 
the Williams opinion embodies the logical extension of Lesm into 
the area of warrantless searches and seizures. It is difficult 
to conceive of any compelling reason why the Supreme Court would 
not apply the Leon rule in a case where an officer's warrantless 
conduct, subsequently determined to be in violation of the fourth 
amendment, was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. 
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£££ Bloom, United Sta tes v. Leon And I t s Ramifications. 56 U. 
Colo. L. Rev. 247, 259-61 (1985); but see People v. Ciraolo . 161 
Cal.App.3d 1081f 208 Cal. Rptr. 93 f 95 (Cal. App. 1984) ( s ta t ing 
t ha t Leon has no appl ica t ion to warrant less searches) , c e r t . 
granted. 105 S.Ct. 2672 (1985). 
Upon examining Leon and Williams, i t l og i ca l l y follows 
tha t Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g) f which appears to be l i t t l e more than 
a codif ica t ion of the good f a i t h exceptions to the exclusionary 
ru le fashioned in Laan and Williams, i s not unconst i tu t ional 
under the federal cons t i t u t i on . JS££ People v. Deitchman, 695 
P.2d 1146, 1153 (Colo. 1985) (Erickson, C.J. f concurring) 
(observing t h a t Colorado's s ta tu tory "good f a i t h " exception to 
the exclusionary ru le i s consis tent with fourth amendment 
precedent and does not v i o l a t e federal cons t i tu t iona l s tandards ) . 
So long as Rule 12(g) i s applied in a manner consis tent with the 
object ive standard of reasonableness adopted by the Supreme 
Courtf Lsjon, 104 S.Ct. a t 3420 n. 20, Utah's s ta tu tory good f a i t h 
exception i s not contrary to federal law. 
B. The Utah Constitution 
The further question of whether Rule 12(g) is contrary 
to article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution remains. 
Historically, this Court has decided search and seizure issues by 
applying federal precedents developed under the fourth amendment. 
£££r e.g.. State v. Gallegos. 23 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1985); S±&t£ 
v. Harris. 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983); fitate v. Romero. 660 P.2d 
715 (Utah 1983). The federal version of the exclusionary rule 
has consistently been applied as the sole remedy for a violation 
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of an individual's constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. See State v. Hygh, 16 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 10, 16 (1985) (Zimmerman, J.f concurring separately). 
However, as noted by Justice Zimmerman in his concurring opinion 
in Hygh, "tslound arguments . . . can be made against acceptance 
of the federal version of the exclusionary rule as the sole 
remedy for unlawful searches and seizures," and "ftlhe federal 
law as it currently exists is certainly not the only permissible 
interpretation of the search and seizure protections contained in 
the Utah Constitution." 16 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. Justice 
Zimmerman further observed that "this Court has never considered
 N 
the appropriateness of possible exceptions to the exclusionary 
rule or the availability of alternative or supplemental remedies, 
such as the imposition of civil liability on police officers." 
Significantly, Utah is one of but a handful of states 
that have enacted a statutory "good faith" exception to the 
exclusionary rule. §§ 77-35-12(g) and 78-16-5 (Supp. 1985). See 
£L&n ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3925 (Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 
16-3-308 (Supp. 1985); CAL. CONST, art. I, § 28(d) (which appears 
to eliminate the exclusionary rule for all "relevant" evidence); 
S. 237 (a bill now pending in Congress—see also S. 1764, 98th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S1066 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1984), 
an identical bill which passed the full Senate in 1984 by a vote 
3
 The wisdom of the exclusionary rule has frequently been the 
subject of debate among commentators. £L££ State v. Bolt, 142 
Ariz. 260, 689 P.2d 519, 528 n. 1 (1984) (Cameron, Justice, 
specially concurring). 
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of 63-24) .4 Admittedly, the statutes in other states have not 
been free from criticism. S££r e.g., Strossf The Colorado 
Statutory Good-Faith Exception To The Exclusionary RuL^i h Step 
Too Far?, 53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 809 (1982). However, commentary on 
Dtahfs Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act of 1982, 1982 Utah Lawsf 
Chap. 10, §§ 1-16, which addedf inter aliaf § 77-35-12(g) and §§ 
78-16-1 through -11, has generally been favorable. S£& Comment, 
1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 138-46; Comment, 9 J. Contemp. L. 171 
(1983). What distinguishes the Utah scheme from those in the 
other states noted is that it provides both an appropriate 
modification of the exclusionary rule and a civil remedy for the 
defendant whose constitutional rights have been violated. An 
excellent outline of the Act's provisions appears in 9 J. 
Contemp. L. at 184-5: 
The Utah Act waives the statutory 
immunity from suit that governmental entities 
are able to invoke for injuries "proximately 
caused or arising out of a violation of 
protected fourth amendment rights." It 
provides a cause of action for damages to 
injured parties against the peace officer who 
violates their fourth amendment rights and/or 
the officer's employing agency. 
Under the Act, the offending officer and 
the officer's employing agency are jointly 
and severally liable for damages if the 
violation is negligent. The officer alone is 
liable for damages "filf the violation [is] 
substantial, grossly negligent, willful, or 
malicious . . . unless the violation [is] the 
result of a general order of the agency. 
When the search or seizure is committed 
intentionally but in good faith, the 
employing agency alone is liable for damages. 
The Act provides that an injured party 
4
 Appendix B contains the text of each of the state provisions 
and the proposed federal law. 
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may sue to recover nominal damages in the 
amount of $100 plus any costs and attorneys' 
fees. In addition, the victim of an illegal 
search or seizure may recover "actual 
damages, including but not limited to injury 
to person, propertyf or reputation." If the 
violation is "substantial, grossly negligent 
willful, or malicious," the Act provides that 
recovery may include, in addition to nominal 
and actual damages, exemplary or punitive 
damages. The Act specifically excludes 
recovery of damages for injuries "resulting 
from a conviction and judgment . . . 
including incarceration, fines, or 
restitution." The Act provides for a cause 
of action and the recovery of damages in lieu 
of the exclusion of otherwise admissible 
evidence in criminal cases. 
The statutory cause of action and the 
ability to recover nominal, actual, and 
punitive damages is provided in lieu of the 
exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence in 
most circumstances. However, the 
exclusionary rule may still be applied under 
the Utah Act when a fourth amendment 
violation is both "substantial" and not 
committed in "good faith." Evidence gained 
in this manner can be suppressed at any stage 
of the criminal proceeding. An individual 
whose rights are violated substantially and 
in bad faith, may elect either to exclude the 
evidence or to sue for damages. When the 
individual chooses to have the evidence 
suppressed, however, the Act precludes any 
additional monetary recovery. 
The Act . . . also allows the employing 
agency to take administrative or disciplinary 
action against an errant officer. 
Finally, the Act provides that when 
there is a victim of a crime, and the 
convicted criminal is awarded damages based 
on a fourth amendment violation, the victim 
of the original crime is entitled to a lien 
against the convicted criminal1s award as 
restitution. [Footnote citations to relevant 
statutes omitted.] 
Unlike the laws in other states, Utah's Act more 
closely resembles the legislative substitute for the exclusionary 
rule suggested by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
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There, he outlined the following requirements: 
(a) a waiver of sovereign immunity as to 
the illegal acts of law enforcement officials 
committed in the performance of assigned 
duties; 
(b) the creation of a cause of action 
for damages sustained by any person aggrieved 
by conduct of governmental agents in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment or statutes 
regulating official conduct; 
(c) the creation of a tribunal, quasi-
judicial in nature or perhaps patterned after 
the United States Court of Claims, to 
adjudicate all claims under the statute: 
(d) a provision that this statutory 
remedy is in lieu of the exclusion of 
evidence secured for use in criminal cases in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment; and 
(e) a provision directing that no 
evidence, otherwise admissible, shall be 
excluded from any criminal proceeding because 
of violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
403 U.S. at 422-3 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Beyond its 
substantial compliance with the requirements of the Bivens 
dissent, the Utah Act appears to be the kind of modification of 
the exclusionary rule that the concurring justices in Hygh would 
find acceptable. In short, it strikes a reasonable balance 
between competing interests by applying the exclusionary rule in 
a criminal case only when that rule is most likely to have its 
desired deterrent effect and awarding civil damages to those 
whose rights have been violated. Two important societal 
interests are protected: valid and trustworthy evidence that 
will lead a factfinder to the truth is not excluded in criminal 
trials, and one deprived of an important constitutional right is 
compensated for that wrong. 
The legislature of this state, which presumably enacts 
only that legislation it believes to be constitutional under both 
the federal and state constitutions, has spoken on the issue of 
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modifying the exclusionary rule in criminal cases by enacting the 
Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act of 1982. This Court implicitly 
adopted Rule 12(g) when, in In Re; Rules Pf Procedurer 18 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3 (1985), it adopted all existing statutory rules of 
procedure not inconsistent with procedural rules previously 
adopted by the Court. See Hygh, 16 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring specially) ("I have found no case in 
which this Court has decided to adopt the exclusionary rule after 
independently analyzing the question of what remedy is available 
for unlawful search or seizure under our state constitution"). 
Moreover, rules of procedure are not solely the province of the 
judiciary in this state; the Utah Constitution allows the 
legislature to modify procedural rules promulgated by this Court. 
UTAH CONST, art. VIII, § 4. Given the compelling policy 
arguments supporting the application of Rule 12(g), which 
operates in conjunction with §§ 78-16-1 through -11, this Court 
should not interpret the Utah Constitution so as to invalidate 
that rule. Although in other instances it may be appropriatef 
there is no good reason here to construe article If section 14 
more narrowly than the federal courts have the fourth amendment. 
2£& State V. Westlung, 705 P.2d 208, 216-7 (Or. App. 1985) (Van 
Hoomissenf J., concurring in part; dissenting in part). By 
recognizing that Rule 12(g) is applicable in criminal cases and 
constitutional under the state constitution, the Court will not 
effectively gut the protections provided in article lf section 
14—the scope of which may or may not be congruent with the scope 
of fourth amendment protections. What will constitute a 
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"substantial" violation under Rule 12(g) necessarily depends on 
what course the Court decides to take in developing future search 
and seizure law in Utah. The Court could develop a jurisprudence 
of state constitutional law to replace the sometimes confusing 
federal precedents in this area. Hygh, 16 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15-
16 (Zimmerman, J., concurring specially). "Clear-cut rules" that 
guidef rather than befuddle, government officials could be 
fashioned by interpreting the search and seizure provisions in 
Utahfs constitution differently than the United States Supreme 
Court has interpreted the fourth amendment, if this Court thinks 
it necessary in order to avoid "imperilling] both the rights of 
individuals and the integrity and effectiveness of law 
enforcement." Xbid. Thus, recognition of Rule 12(g) as both a 
desirable and constitutional component of Utah law is the first 
step toward a more sensible approach to enforcement of the 
criminal laws without compromising an individuals rights under 
the fourth amendment and article I, section 14. 
In conclusion, the Court should hold that Rule 12(g) is 
not only constitutional, but also the controlling rule in all 
criminal cases when the question of suppression of evidence for 
an allegedly unlawful search or seizure is presented. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED AN INCORRECT STANDARD 
OF LAW IN DETERMINING THAT THE STOP OF 
DEFENDANTS' VEHICLE WAS UNLAWFUL. UNDER THE 
PROPER STANDARD, THE OFFICERS1 STOP OF THE 
VEHICLE WAS LEGAL. ALTERNATIVELY, THE STOP 
WAS NEITHER A SUBSTANTIAL VIOLATION OF 
DEFENDANTS1 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS NOR A 
VIOLATION COMMITTED IN BAD FAITH. 
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In holding that the stop of defendants1 vehicle was 
unlawful, which provided the sole basis for suppressing the 
challenged evidence, the trial court applied an incorrect 
standard of law. It ruled that "there were no articulable facts 
as a basis or probable cause for [the] officers to make the 
initial stop of [defendants* (emphasis added). When determining 
whether an investigatory stop of an automobile, like that at 
issue here, is lawful, the court must ask whether the police 
officers acted upon "reasonable suspicion," not "probable cause." 
United States v. Cortez, 449 u.s. 411 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 u.s. 648 (1979); United States Vt Brignoni-Ponger 422 u.s. 
873 (1975); State v, Swanigan, 699 p.2d 718 (Utah 1985); state v, 
£iks£nr 665 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1983). Clearly, this was not the 
standard applied by the trial court when it suppressed the 
evidence seized pursuant to the stop. Therefore, two questions 
are presented: (1) under the "reasonable suspicion" test was the 
stop of defendants1 vehicle legal? and (2) if the stop was 
illegal, was the evidence seized pursuant to it still admissible 
under Utah R. Crim P. 12(g)?5 
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court 
held that the fourth amendment "forbids stopping or detaining 
persons for questioning about their citizenship on less than a 
5
 For purposes of addressing these questions, the State will 
assume, arguendo, that defendants have standing to challenge the 
search of the vehicle they were driving, whether or not the 
initial stop was lawful. In Point III, infra, the State argues 
that defendants do not have standing to challenge the search of 
the car; however, that argument presumes the legality of the 
initial stop. Thus, the State addresses the issue regarding the 
legality of the stop prior to the standing issue. 
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reasonable suspicion t h a t they may be a l i e n s . " 422 U.S. at 884. 
"Officers on roving pat rol may stop vehic les only if they are 
aware of spec i f ic a r t i c u l a b l e fac t s f together with ra t iona l 
inferences from those f a c t s , tha t reasonably warrant suspicion 
tha t the vehic les contain a l i ens who may be i l l e g a l l y in the 
country." xfcid.; £££ .SLSG United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 
417-18; state Vt Swaniganf 699 p.2d at 719; state v» Gibson, 665 
P.2d a t 1304. A number of fac tors may be taken in to account in 
forming a reasonable suspicion: 
Officers may consider the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
the area in which they encounter a veh ic l e . 
I t s proximity to the border, the usual 
pa t t e rns of t r a f f i c on the pa r t i cu la r road, 
and previous experience with a l i en t r a f f i c 
are a l l r e levan t . See Carrol l v. United 
£tai££f 267 U.S. 132, 159-161 (1925); United 
States Vt Jaime-Barriosf 494 F.2d 455 (CA9), 
ce r t , denied, 417 U.S. 972 (1974). They also 
may consider information about recent i l l e g a l 
border crossing in the area. The d r i v e r ' s 
behavior may be re levant , as e r r a t i c driving 
or obvious attempts to evade off icers can 
support a reasonable suspicion. .£££ United-
States Vt Larios-Montesr 500 F.2d 941 (CA9 
1974); Duprez v. United S t a t e s , 435 F.2d 1276 
(CA9 1970). Aspects of the vehicle i t s e l f 
may j u s t i f y suspicion. For ins tance , 
of f icers say t h a t ce r ta in s t a t i on wagons, 
with large compartments for fold-down sea ts 
or spare t i r e s , are frequently used for 
t ranspor t ing concealed a l i e n s . .&££ United 
States v. Burgarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853 (CA9 
1973) , c e r t , den ied , 414 U.S. 1136 (1974); 
United States v> Wright, 476 F.2d 1027 (CAS 
1973). The vehic le may appear to be heavily 
loaded, i t may have an extraordinary number 
of passengers, or the of f icers may observe 
persons t ry ing to hide . £££ United S ta tes v. 
Larios-Montes, £U£ia. The Government also 
points out t h a t t ra ined of f icers can 
recognize the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c appearance of 
persons who l i v e in Mexico, relying on such 
fac tors as the mode of dress and ha i r cu t . 
Reply Brief for United S ta tes 12-13, in 
United S ta tes v. Or t iz , postr p . 891. in a l l 
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situations the officer is entitled to assess 
the facts in light of his experience in 
detecting illegal entry and smuggling. Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 27. 
422 U.S. at 884-5. 
Although the courts have not always been in agreement 
as to what a r t i c u l a b l e fac t s are suf f ic ien t to support a 
reasonable suspicion in t h i s context, .S££, e .g . > United Sta tes v. 
Varela-Andujo, 746 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir . 1984) (suff ic ient 
a r t i c u l a b l e f ac t s to j u s t i fy s top) ; United Sta tes v. Melendez-
Gonzalez, 727 P.2d 407 (5th Cir . 1984) (fact tha t car r iding low 
and t r a v e l l i n g 50 yards behind truck on sparsely t r ave l l ed road 
60 miles from border not enough); United Sta tes v. SaenzF 578 
P.2d 643 (5th Cir . 1978), ££x£. ifenjjeja, 439 U.S. 1075 (stop 
upheld where vehicles t r ave l l ed in tandem fashion for about an 
hour and driver appeared nervous); United Sta tes v. Lamas, 608 
P.2d 547 (5th Cir . 1979) (fact tha t occupants of car avoided eye 
contact "cannot weigh in the balance in any way") (compare United 
Sta tes v. Barnard, 553 F.2d 389 (5th Cir . 1977) (stop upheld, one 
factor being tha t driver glanced repeatedly and nervously at 
border pa t ro l off icer and then drove e r r a t i c a l l y ) ) , 6 the 
a r t i c u l a b l e fac t s ava i lab le to the off icers in the ins tan t case 
amounted to a reasonable suspicion to ju s t i fy the stop of 
defendants to inquire about t h e i r c i t i zensh ip . When the seven 
fac tors r e l i ed upon by the off icers in making the stop (which are 
0
 For further discussion of and author i ty for what cons t i tu tes 
reasonable suspicion in t h i s context, see Comment, 10 Am. J. 
Crim. L. 245 (1982); LAFAVE, SEARCH and SEIZURE § 10.5 (1978 and 
Supp. 1985). 
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noted in this brief's statement of facts, supra at 4) are taken 
together and considered in light of those officers' extensive 
experience with the border patrol, see Cortez; Brierley v. 
Schoenfeld. F.2d , Case No. 85-1332, slip op. at 8 (10th 
Cir. 1986), one should conclude that the stop was lawful under 
the "reasonable suspicion" test. Accordingly, this Court should 
rule that the trial court not only applied an incorrect legal 
standard, but also erred in concluding that the stop was 
unconstitutional and that the evidence seized pursuant to the 
stop must be suppressed. 
Even if the Court were to find that the stop was not 
supported by a reasonable suspicion, the evidence seized pursuant 
to the stop was still admissible under Rule 12(g). At the very 
least, this case presents a close question on whether a 
reasonable suspicion existed. Given the sometimes irreconcilable 
differences in court decisions in this area, and the absence of 
any Utah case law specifically dealing with a similar factual 
situation, the officers' act of stopping defendants under the 
circumstances presented certainly would not constitute a 
"substantial" violation of defendants' rights under the fourth 
amendment and article I, section 14. ite£ Rule 12(g)(2). To the 
contrary, their actions constituted only a minor violation 
reflecting reasonable law enforcement activity that should not 
result in the exclusion of substantial, reliable evidence. S&& 
United States v. Leon. U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984); 
United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en 
banc), ££x£^ jaenifidr 449 U.S. 1127 (1981); £f. Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that, in civil 
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rights actions, government officials "are shielded from liability 
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known"). There being no evidence of 
bad faith on the part of the officers, SSLSL Rule 12(g)(3), if this 
Court finds the stop was invalid, it should rule that the 
suppressed evidence was, nevertheless, admissible under Rule 
12(g). 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT DEPENDANTS HAD 
STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THE 
SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE THEY WERE DRIVING IS 
CONTRARY TO STATE V. VALDEZ, 689 P . 2 d 1334 
(UTAH 1 9 8 4 ) . 
In granting defendants1 motions to suppress, the trial 
court ruled that both defendants "had standing to raise the issue 
of the constitutionality and legality of the stop, search and 
seizure in that the evidence was unrebutted that the owner of 
said vehicle had given his permission to Defendant Mendoza to be 
in and use said vehicle up to and including the time said vehicle 
was stopped and seized and that Defendant Mendieta had standing 
in the use of the purpose [sic] of the trip and that the 
defendants were lawfully and legally in possession of said 
automobile against all but the owner thereof and that they had a 
valid and lawful expectation of privacy while therein" 
(Appendix A). The court based its finding of standing solely on 
defendants1 possession of and presence in the vehicle they were 
driving, even though neither owned that vehicle. 
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This casef on the facts presented to the trial court, 
is indistinguishable from State v. Valdez. 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 
1984) . There, a unanimous Court held that the defendant, who did 
not own the car which he was driving and which was the object of 
the search complained of, lacked standing to complain of the 
search which followed a stop made by police officers. It is 
clear from Valdez that mere possession of property, or presence 
therein or thereon, without some showing of a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the effects searched is not enough to 
gain standing to challenge the search* Therefore, defendants 
who, like Valdez, did not own the car they were driving (but had 
simply borrowed it) and did not show any legitimate expectation 
of privacy in that car (mere possession not being sufficient), 
lack standing to challenge the search of the car and ultimate 
seizure of the marijuana, at least not on the basis found by the 
trial court.7 L^alilfiz, 689 P.2d at 1335, citing State v. Purcell, 
586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
reverse the trial court's order suppressing the challenged 
evidence and remand the case to the district court with an order 
to allow admission of that evidence. 
7
 Although there is some support for the argument that defendants 
do not have standing even to object to the allegedly illegal stop 
of their car, e.g. Kayes v. State, 409 So*2d 1075 (Fla. App. 
1981) (passenger without standing to object to illegal stop of 
vehicle); State v. Cowen, 104 Idaho 649, 662 P.2d 230 (1983) 
(Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) interpreted as barring 
passenger from questioning stop of car) , the State does not 
advance that argument here. 
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DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON & 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to John E. 
Meyers, Attorney for Defendant Mendieta, The Bradbury Building, 
304 South Broadway, Suite 432, Los Angeles, California, and J. 
MacArthur Wright, Attorney for Defendant Mendoza, WRIGHT & MILES 
P.O. Box 339, St. George, Utah 84770, this of January, 
1986. 
<




WRIGHT & MILES 
By J. MacArthur Wright 
John L. Miles 
Attorneys for Defendants 
60 North 300 East 
P.O. Box 339 
St. George, UT 84770 
Phone: 628-2612 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALBERTO RUIZ MENDIETA, and 
ADOLFO DIAZ MENDOZA, 
Defendants. 
1 ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
1 TO SUPPRESS 
1 Criminal No. 1312 • 
i 1311V^ 
Defendants, ADOLFO DIAZ MENDOZA and ALBERTO RUIZ 
MENDIETA, having filed their Motions to Suppress all items of 
evidence, including contraband seized from a Mustang automobile 
which Defendant, Mendoza, was driving and in which Defendant, 
Mendieta, was riding, and any statements of either party given to 
Border Patrol officers, members of the Washington County 
Sheriff's Department or any other law enforcement agency 
subsequent to the stop, arrest and search of said Defendants and 
automobile respectively, and hearing having been held before the 
Court on July 12, 1985, and evidence and testimoney having been 
introduced and parties having submitted points and authorities, 
and the Court having considered the evidence and testimony and 
reviewed the authorities submitted by counsel and reviewed the 
file and for other good cause appearing, having taken the matter 
under advisement, now makes its ruling: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, adjudged and decreed that the 
evidence seized by the Washington County Sheriff's officers or 
any other law enforcement officers, including but not limited to 
FIFT,0 £»CtAl DST COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY 
suppressed, and any statments made by the Defendants above-named 
subsequent to the stop, search, seizure and arrest of Defendants 
on or about March 16, 1985, be suppressed for the reason that the 
Immigration Officers who made said stop, search and arrest were 
engaged in a roving patrol, that there were no articuable facts 
as a basis or probable cause for said officers to make the 
initial stop of the Defendants and that the stop was conducted in 
an unreasonable manner. 
IT IS FURTHER found that the Defendants, each and both, 
had standing to raise the issue of the constitutionality and 
legality of the stop, search and seizure in that the evidence was 
unrebutted that the owner of said vehicle had given his 
permission to Defendant, Mendoza, to be in and use said vehicle 
up to and including the time said vehicle was stopped and seized 
and that Defendant Mendieta had standing in the use of the 
purpose of the trip and that the defendants were lawfully and 
legally in possession of said automobile and had exclusive use 
and possession of said automobile against mil but the owner 
thereof and that they had a valid and l^xul expectation of 
privacy while therein. 
/ / day of DATED this 985. 
mtPK~ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SDPPRESS 
to Brent Rowe, County Attorneys Office, 220 North 200 East, St. 
George, UT, and also to John E. Meyers, Attorney At Law, at The 
Bradbury Building, 304 South Broadway, Suite 432, Los Angeles, CA 
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ind C-419848 v. State (1983) 136 Ariz. 175, 665 
WW 57. 
L&. Bwrten of proof 
If person from whom property was taken chal-
aoges seizure of items not named in search 
varrant, state must establish legality of seizure 
if such Hems by preponderance of evidence, and 
nay do so by showing that property is unlawful 
bo possess, that property is stolen, or by showing 
loroe other reason why property is subject to 
seizure. Search Warrants C-419847 and 
C-419848 v. State (1983) 136 Ariz. 175, 665 P.2d 
57. 
State has burden to prove that property seized 
without warrant was nevertheless lawfully 
seized under some exception to warrant require-
ment; if, however, warrant has been issued, 
there is presumption that warrant is valid, requi-
site probable cause having been shown, and it is 
then individual's burden to prove invalidity of 
search and seizure. Search Warrants C-419847 
and C-419848 v. State (1983) 136 Ariz. 175, 665 
P.2d57. 
CRIMINAL CODE 
Unlike challenge to grounds for issuing search 
warrant where individual bears burden of proof 
state must bear burden once individual establish-
es that item seized from him is not described is 
search warrant Search Warrants C-419847 and 
C-419848 v. Stat* (1983) 136 Ariz. 175, 665 P.2d 
57. 
3. Review 
Motion for restoration of seized property, con-
troverting grounds upon which warrants were 
issued, was civil in nature, notwithstanding that 
pertinent statute, this section, is found in crimi-
nal code; order denying motion which disposed 
of cause on merits and left no question remain-
ing for judicial determination was civil judgment 
appealable as of right to the Court of Appeals 
Greehling v. State (1982) 135 Ariz. 498, 662 P.2d 
1005. 
4. Jurisdiction 
Court of appeals has jurisdiction to review 
request for relief under this section. Mehrens v. 
State (App.1983) 138 Ariz. 458, 675 P.2d 718, 
certiorari denied 105 S.Ct 219, 83 LEd.2d 149. 
CRIMINAL CODE 
Harmless error 3 
bapemchment 4 
Probable cause 2 
Retroactive effect 1.5 
| 13-3925. - Admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of unlawful search or 
seizure; definitions 
A. If a party in a criminal proceeding seeks to exclude evidence from the trier of fact 
because of the conduct of a peace officer in obtaining the evidence, the proponent of the 
evidence may urge that the peace officer's conduct was taken in a reasonable, good faith 
belief that the conduct was proper and that the evidence discovered should not be kept 
from the trier of fact if otherwise admissible. 
B. The trial court shall not suppress evidence which is otherwise admissible in a 
crimina] proceeding if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a peace 
officer as a result of a good faith mistake or technical violation. 
C. In this section: 
1. "Good faith mistake" means a reasonable judgmental error concerning the exist-
ence of facts which if true would be sufficient to constitute probable cause. 
2. "Technical violation" means a reasonable good faith reliance upon: 
(a) A statute which is subsequently ruled unconstitutional. 
(b) A warrant which is later invalidated due to a good faith mistake. 
(c) A controlling court precedent which is later overruled, unless the court overruling 
the precedent orders the new precedent to be applied retroactively. 
D. This section shall not be construed to limit the enforcement of any appropriate civil 
remedy or criminal sanction in actions pursuant to other provisions of law against any 
individual or government entity found to have conducted an unreasonable search or 
seizure. 
K. This section does not apply to unlawful electronic eavesdropping or wiretapping 
Added by Laws 1982, Ch. 161, § 1. 
19S2 Reviser*! Note: Library References 
Pursuant to authority of | 41-1304.02, "; defi- Criminal Law ••394.4(1). 
nitons" was added to the heading of this section. CJ.S. Criminal Law § 657(2) et seq. 
Croat References 
Issuance of warrant, 
| 13-3913. 
probable cause, see Notes of Decisions 
In genera! 1 
L In general 
Probable cause validates warrantle 
where there is information sufficient 
belief by a reasonable man that an < 
being or has been committed. State 
(App.1982) 131 Ariz. 563, 643 P.2d 8. 
Warrantless search of defendant's t 
and opening of closet door in bun I 
which illegal alien was hidden was 
where officer had received tip that 
had chained illegal alien to a tree, o* 
observed a large chain around tree 
bunkhouse which went through fron 
bunkhouse, and defendant consented t 
entry into the bunkhouse to see what v 
of the chain, in that from position of 
actions of defendant, and information 
an illegal alien had been chained on th* 
a reasonable person could conclude t 
alien was still somewhere inside the b 
Id. 
1.5. Retroactive effect 
"Good faith" exception in provisi< 
section governing admissibility of ev 
tained as result of unlawful search • 
which provision became effective Jul: 
with no expressed declaration of re 
ARTICLE i 
| 13-3931. Search of accused b 
Law Review Commentaries 
Administrative dormitory inspectio 
university. 19 Ariz.L.Rev. 560 (1977) 
English criminal justice la it b 
ours? 26 Aro.LRev. 507 (1984). 
Cross References 
Bail bond agents, 
Bond, see } 20-320. 
Place of business and mam* 
records, see § 20-319. 
| 13-3961. Offenses not bailab 
A. A person in custody shall 
presumption p e a t that he is gu 
offense. 
B. A person in custody shall 
felony offense and the state cert 
matter that there is clear and 
substantial danger to another pe 
176 
California 
A r t . 1, § 2 8 DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
(c) Right to Safe Schools. All students and staff of public primary, 
elementary, junior high and senior high schools have the inalienable right 
to attend campuses which are safe, secure and peaceful. 
(d) Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute here-
after enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of 
the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal 
proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, 
or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether 
heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any 
existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or 
Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103. Nothing in this section shall 
affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the press. 
(e) Public Safety Bail. A person may be released on bail by suffi-
cient sureties, except for capital crimes when the facts are evident or the 
presumption great. Excessive bail may not be required. In setting, 
reducing or denying bail, the judge or magistrate shall take into consid-
eration the protection of the public, the seriousness of the offense 
charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probabili-
ty of his or her appearing at the trial or hearing of the case. Public 
safety shall be the primary consideration. 
A person may be released on his or her own recognizance in the court's 
discretion, subject to the same factors considered in setting bail. How-
ever, no person charged with the commission of any serious felony shall 
be released on his or her own recognizance. 
Before any person arrested for a serious felony may be released on 
bail, a hearing may be held before the magistrate or judge, and the 
prosecuting attorney shall be given notice and reasonable opportunity to 
be heard on the matter. 
When a judge or magistrate grants or denies bail or release on a 
person's own recognizance, the reasons for that decision shall be stated 
in the record and included in the court's minutes. 
(f) Use of Prior Convictions. Any prior felony conviction of any 
person in any criminal proceeding, whether adult or juvenile, shall 
subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of impeachment or 
enhancement of sentence in any criminal proceeding. When a prior 
felony conviction is an element of any felony offense, it shall be proven 
to the trier of fact in open court. 
(f) Serious felony. As used in this article, the term "serious felony" 
is any crime defined in Penal Code, Section 1192.7(c). 
(Added by Initiative Measure, approved by the people, June 8, 1982) 
Amendment of Const. Art J, § 12 by Assembly Const. 
Amend. No. 14 (1982) was approved by a higher affirmative 
vote at the primary election held June 8, 1982 than Initiative 
Measure which repealed Const. Art. 1 § 12, and added this 
section which included a new provision on "Public Safety 
Bail". If provisions of 2 or more measures approved at the 
same election conflict, those of the measure receiving the 
highest affirmative vote shall prevail, see Const. Art. 2, § 10; 




actions generally, see ( 13-17-102. 
1ZURES 
rounds. (2) (g) Which is kept, 
nsed, or possessed in violation 
es involving a serious threat to J 
F the whereabouts of or in the 
trrest warrant is outstanding, 
jr this section to search for any 
t standing. 
ded,L.85,p.615, § § 1 , 2 . 
nd seizure other than the provisions of 
ire, see § 7 of article II of the Colorado 
the "Colorado Children's Code", see 
>n dealing with searches, see 61 Den. 
SI (1984). 
lied in People v. Stoppel, 637 P.2d $84 
1981). 
• 
lavit need not be attached to warrant 
There is nothing which requires that a 
given a warrant must receive a copy of 
Jellying affidavit or that a copy thereof 
* attached to the copy of the warrant 
is served at the time of the search, 
v. Papez, 652 P.2d 619 (Colo. App. 
documents attached to and incorporated 
ffidavit by reference need not be sworn 
ratel) and may thus fall within the four 
» of the affidavit. People v. Campbell, 
:d 1035 (Colo. App. 1983). 
I faith basis required to challenge 
t affidavits. As conditions to a veracity 
testing the truth of averments con-
in a warrant affidavit, a motion to sup-
mist be supported by one or more 
ts reflecting a good faith basis for the 
pc and contain a specification of the 
statements challenged People v. 
639 P.2d 1068 (Colo. 1982). 
ed in People v. Con well, 649 P. 2d 1099 
1982). 
Arrest - Searches and Seizures 
n CONTENT AND SIFF1CIENCY OF 
AFFIDAVIT. 
Judge must look within the four corners, etc. 
In accord with original. See People \ . 
Undholm. 197 Colo. 270, 591 P.2d 1032 (1979). 
Affidavit interpreted with common sense. In 
interpreting an affidavit for a search warrant 
gnd the execution of the warrant, a common 
tense interpretation must be applied People v. 
pel Alamo. 624 P.2d 13(M (Colo. 1981). 
Affidavit must supph underlying fact. 
In accord with original See People v. 
Undholm. 197 Colo. 270,591 P.2d 1032 (1979); 
People v Dailey, 639 P.2d 1068 (Colo. 1982) 
Identification of wrong street not dispositive 
uf affidavits efficacy. Fact that the affidavit 
identified the wrong street, which was less 
than one block away from the actual location 
of the truck to be searched, was not dispositive 
16-3-904. Search warrants - contents. 
I. Genera) Consideration. 
III. Description of Property. 
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION. 
Annotator's Bote. For further annotations 
concerning search and seizure, see section 7 
of article II of the Colorado Constitution and . 
Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. 
16-3-308 
Del of an affidavit's efficac\ People 
Alamo. 624 P.2d 13(U (Colo 19811. 
For evidence constituting probablt cause. See 
People v Lindholm. 197 Colo 270. 59) P 2d 
1032 (1979). 
Deletion or inaccuracies not fatal, etc. 
The fact that some portions of an affidavit 
must be stricken because the\ are erroneous. 
or that a portion of the evidence relied on for 
a finding of probable cause is not proper)> 
recorded and ma> not be considered does noi 
require the issuing magistrate to ignore the 
other information supplied b> the affidavit. 
People v. Gable, 647 P.2d 246 (Colo App. 
1982). 
A search warrant may be based on hearsay, 
etc. 
In accord with original. See People v. 
Lindholm, 197 Colo. 270,591 P.2d 1032 (1979). 
ID. DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY. 
Search warrant reasonably specific under cir-
cumstances. See People v. Lindholm, 197 
Colo. 270, 591 P.2d 1032 (1979). 
In determining whether warrant is too gen-
eral, the nature of the property to be seized 
must be considered People v. Lindholm, 197 
Colo. 270,591 P.2d 1032 0979); People v. Ball. 
639 P.2d 1078 (Colo. 1982); People v. Hill, 690 
P.2d 856 (Colo. 1984). 
16-3-305. Search warrants - direction - execution and return. 
Annotator's note. For further annotations 
concerning search and seizure, see section 7 
of article II of the Colorado Constitution and 
Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. 
Evidence seized in violation of a statutory 
provision may be suppressed only if the 
unauthorized search and seizure violated con-
stitutional restraints on unreasonable searches 
and seizures People v. Hamer, 689 P.2d 1147 
(Colo. App. 1984). 
16*3-308. Evidence - admissibility - declaration of purpose. (1) Evidence 
which is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding shall not be suppressed 
by the trial court if the court determines that the evidence was seized by 
a peace officer, as defined in section 18-1-901 (3) 0), C.R.S., as a result of 
a good faith mistake or of a technical violation. 
(2) As used in subsection (1) of this section: 
(a) "Good faith mistake" means a reasonable judgmental error concern-
ing the existence of facts or law which if true would be sufficient to constitute 
probable cause. 
(b) "Technical violation" means a reasonable good faith reliance upon 
a statute which is later ruled unconstitutional, a warrant which is later invali-
dated due to a good faith mistake, or a court precedent which is later over-
ruled. 
6-3-308 Criminal Proceedings Arrest - Searches 
(3) Evidence which is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding and 
'hich is obtained as a result of a confession voluntarily made in i 
oncustodial setting shall not be suppressed by the trial court. [ 
(4) (a) It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the state of Colo-
ido that, when evidence is sought to be excluded from the trier of fact is 
criminal proceeding because of the conduct of a peace officer leading to 
s discovery, it will be open to the proponent of the evidence to urge thai 
le conduct in question was taken in a reasonable, good faith belief that it 
as proper, and in such instances the evidence so discovered should not be | 
jpt from the trier of fact if otherwise admissible. This section is necessary! 
) identify the characteristics of evidence which will be admissible in a court 
Flaw. This section does not address or attempt to prescribe court procedure 
(b) It shall be prima facie evidence that the conduct of the peace officer 
as performed in the reasonable good faith belief that it was proper if there j 
a showing that the evidence was obtained pursuant to and within the scope 
* a warrant, unless the warrant was obtained through intentional and mate-
il misrepresentation. 
Source: Added, L. 81, p. 922, § 1; (2)(a) and (4) amended, L. 85, p. 615, §3 ,4 . 
Cross reference: For the admissibility of evidence in proceedings under the "Colorado Children's 
de", see § 19-2-107 
Editor's note: Section 14 of chapter 135, Session Laws of Colorado 1985, provides that sections 
ind 4 of the act set out in that chapter amending subsections (2Xa) and (4) is effective July 
1985, and applies to evidence obtained on or after said date 
tnnotator's note. For annotations concern-
the exclusionary rule, see section 7 of arti-
II of the Colorado Constitution and 
lorado Rules of Criminal Procedure 26 and 
-aw reviews. For article, "Colorado's Good-
th Exception to the Exclusionary Rule", 
II Colo Law 410 (1982) For article, 
ood-Fajth Exception to the Exclusionary 
le The Fourth Amendment is Not a Technt-
ity'\ see 11 Colo Law. 704 (1982) For arti-
, "Attacking the Seizure — Over-coming 
od Faith", see II Colo Law 2395 (1982) 
• note, "The Colorado Statutory Good-
th Exception to the Exclusionary Rule A 
p Too Far'*" see 53 U. Colo L Rev 809 
52) For^comment, "Privacy Rights v. Law 
"orcement Difficulties The clash of Com-
ing Interests in New York v. Belton", see 
U Den LJ 793 (1982) For article, 
arrant Requirement — The Burger Court 
>roach ", see 53 U Colo L Rev 691 
J2) For article. "Search Warrants, Hear-
and Probable Cause — The Supreme Court 
trues the Rules', see 12 Colo Law 1250 
J3) For article, "Criminal Procedure 
ch discusses a recent Tenth Circuit deci-
i dealing vtith the exclusionary rule. >ee 61 
Den. L.J 291 (1984) For comment, "The 
Good Faith Exception The Seventh Circuit 
Limits the Exclusionary Rule in the Adminis 
trative Context*, see 61 Den LJ 597(1984) 
Section inapplicable to mistaken judgment of 
taw. A mistaken judgment of law, such as the 
mistaken judgment by an officer that the facts 
known to him are sufficient to warrant a full 
custodial arrest of the defendant, is insuffi 
cicnt to cause the application of this statute 
People v. Quintero, 657 P 2d 948 (Colo 1983). 
cert granted, 463 U S 1206, 77 L Ed 2d 1386 
104 S Ct. 62. cert dismissed, 463 U S 1206 
104 S Ct 543, 78 L Ed 2d 719 (1983) (decided 
under subsection (2Xa) pnor to 1985 amend-
ment) 
Search by police of tenant's premises based 
on consent by landlord is mistake of law since 
it is well settled that a landlord cannot give 
such consent People v Brewer. 690 P 2d 860 
(Colo 1984) 
Section does not apply to an aiTest based on 
a warrant void from its inception due to the 
absence of anv cause whatever for its issu-
ance People v Mitchell, 678 P 2d 990 (Colo 
1984) 
No technical violation nhere court precedent 
relied on »i« b*s*d on difTirtni facts. Technical 
on was not found for good faith reliance 
f jnor court decision where such precedent 
lK-3-309. Admissibility of laboratory 
rized in so small a quantity or unstable 
[testing will not leave a sufficient quanti 
Jysis by the defendant's expert and 
formance of his duties, can reasonal 
favorable to the defendant, the t 
wecution's evidence if the court deten 
t good faith and in accordance with regi 
hbe evidence which might have been fa>*o 
p (2) The trial court shall consider the f 
[•aant to subsection (1) of this section, wl 
> preserve the evidence: 
(a) Whether or not a suspect has be 
ether or not the suspect has retained c 
[fcr him at the time of testing; 
(b) Whether the state should have i 
f Rely to preserve the results of seized ev 
(c) Whether, when the test results art 
Jion, the state should have photographe 
fiesults as evidence; 
(d) Whether the state should have pre 
(c) Whether it was necessary for the 
analysis of the evidence, 
E (0 Whether there is sufficient sampk 
[ fcr analysis and the suspect or defendan 
•^crve such sample, 
**4 (g) If paragraph (0 of this subsection 
°f the small amount of evidence, or wl 
tvidence would otherwise be enhanced 
*ate to have contacted the defendant t 
*> be present during the testing 
0) With regard to testing performed 
, *hich form the basis for a conclusion i 
• j ^ s , it is hereby declared to be the p 
™a* when the prosecution's evidence of 
*rom the tner of fact in a cnmmal proc 
J^cnce which might have been favor* 
to the proponent of the evidence to ui 
Performed in good faith and in accordar 
to preserve the evidence which might ' 
****» in such instances, the evidence so 
*•* trier of fact if otherwise admissible. 
(*) For all other types of blood analv 
•* and for laboratory testing, such as se, 
• t . and gunpowder pattern testing, it 
*°ticy of the state of Colorado that, wh 
?$u ' t s is sought to be excluded from the 
Because of the destruction of evidence 




To amend title 18 to limit the application of the exclusionary rule. 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
JANUABY 22 (legislative day, JANUARY 21), 1985 
Mr. THURMOND (for himself, Mr. LAXALT, Mr. HATCH, Mr. ABDNOB, Mr. 
CHILES, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. LONG, Mr. ZOBNISKY, Mr. DENTON, Mr. 
JOHNSTON, Mr. T'BIBLE, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. EAST, Mr. HELMS, and Mr. 
BOBEN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to 
the Committee on the Judiciary 
A BILL 
TO amend title 18 to limit the application of the exclusionary 
rule. 
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Bepresenta-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
3 That this Act may be cited as the "Exclusionary Rule Limi-
4 tation Act of 1985". 
5 SEC. 2. (a) Chapter 223 of title 18, United States Code, 




1 "§ 3505. Limitation of the fourth amendment exclusionary 
2 rule 
3 "Except as specifically provided by statute, evidence 
4 which is obtained as a result of a search or seizure and which 
5 is otherwise admissible shall not be exclused in a proceeding 
6 in a court of the United States if the search or seizure was 
7 undertaken in a reasonable, good faith belief that it was in 
8 conformity with the fourth amendment to the Constitution of 
9 the United States. A showing that evidence was obtained 
10 pursuant to and within the scope of a warrant constitutes 
11 prima facie evidence of such a reasonable good faith belief, 
12 unless the warrant was obtained through intentional and ma-
13 terial misrepresentation/' 
14 (b) The table of sections of such chapter is amended by 
15 adding at the end thereof the following item: 
"3505. Limitation of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule/'. 
